Ideas and practices of development and security have evolved separately in institutional, scholarly, and non-governmental forums. Recent attempts to re-think the "securitydevelopment" nexus have also encountered significant misunderstanding on both sides of the divide, hindering policies and programs to reduce violence, crime, and insecurity in ways that could promote human, social, and economic development. This nexus can be examined through the optics of academic concepts, empirical evidence, and programming experience. This chapter
that development and progress led to greater personal security, even to the level of national and international security (Angell 1909 : Bloch 1899 . Unfortunately, these predictions were proven terribly wrong in the trenches of the Great War, and the processes of modernization and industrial development also radically altered the capacity of states to threaten the security of their citizens, and that of other states, through mass warfare and state violence. This paradox of modernity-its ability simultaneously to create unprecedented domestic peace and total insecurity on a global scale-helps explain the twentieth-century preoccupation with inter-state war and large-scale state violence as the main threats to security (Krause 2009 ).
Development and human progress was, however, still regarded as the "solution" to war and insecurity, especially as influential analyses of the consequences of the Great War (such as John Maynard Keynes' The Economic Consequences of the Peace) pointed presciently to the potentially destabilizing and conflict-producing consequences of failed or incorrect economic policies. Likewise, analyses of the protectionist policies of the 1930s associated them (and the Great Depression) with the rise of fascism and authoritarianism-and the Second World War (Kindelberger 1986 ). Not surprisingly, this vision of economic development as the solution to the problem of conflict and war informed the Keynesian orthodoxy of "embedded liberalism" that shaped the post-war Bretton Woods institutions (Ruggie 1982; Lombardi, this volume) and the entire multilateral architecture (Jolly, this volume) dealing with reconstruction and development since 1945.
One important illustration of how security was considered as a subordinate or derivative good was the way in which mainstream economic thought considered investments in security as essentially unproductive-captured by the idea of a "guns versus butter" trade-off. Military spending and spending on personal security (through private security or personal protection)
were considered inefficient, since they did not enhance productive capacity or (with the possible exception of "military Keynesianism") generate growth. The empirical evidence is mixed, but on balance "suggests that there is little or no evidence for a positive effect on economic growth and that [military spending] is more likely to have a negative effect, or at best no significant impact at all" on economic growth (Dunne and Uye 2009).
This one-way view of how development and insecurity posed a dual problem. First, it presumed that conflict, crime, violence, and insecurity are exogenous to development processes, and that they constitute ruptures, pathologies or disruptions that are not integral to or inextricably intertwined with development itself. As several analysts have pointed out, the process of development itself may exacerbate insecurity and trigger violence, through rapid social change, the unequal distribution of goods and growth, or differential access to benefits (Cramer 2007).
Second, it recognized that the minimal conditions of security (in all its dimensions) were a precondition for development, especially in conflict-prone and fragile settings. The trade-off between "guns and butter," if it exists, only kicks in after a baseline level of security has been established. Empirically, in many states in the post-colonial world, these basic conditions of security either did not exist or were compromised by large-scale conflict, crime, and violence, thus potentially undermining the promotion of development as a means to attenuate conflicts and enhance security. These observations ultimately reopened the debate on the connection between development and conflict, crime, and violence.
Post-colonial development policy
It was some time, however, before the bi-directional linkage between insecurity and development manifested itself in policy circles. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, national security and economic development concerns continued to occupy two distinct worlds of policy and practice.
Geopolitical interests in the Cold War were not absent from the overall aims of development policy ("making the world safe from communism"), and both the United States and the Soviet allies in the early years of decolonization. Development assistance, in this sense, has never been free from security concerns. The security under discussion was, however, that of the West (or East), and not necessarily that of the governments or citizens of newly independent states, and development policies often went hand in hand with some fairly destructive Cold War interventions (Bates 2009; Harriss, this volume) . International institutions such as the World Bank, by contrast, excluded the national security concerns of recipient states from their mandates because these were seen as touching upon issues of national sovereignty. Defense spending, public order, political violence, state security forces-all were excluded from the ambit of development policy making, which concentrated first on technical assistance, and then on meeting basic human needs and promoting poverty reduction (and more recently on achieving the MDGs).
The mainstream understanding of the link between development on the one hand, and violence, crime, and insecurity on the other rested on two beliefs: development would reduce the incidence of conflict and violence within, and potentially even between, states.
 The process of development and socio-economic change was more or less distinct from the dynamics of conflict and insecurity within and between states.
These two beliefs were firmly anchored in the organizational culture and practices of development organizations. As anyone who has visited development agencies, connected with non-governmental development organizations, or spent time with development practitioners can testify, the language of "conflict and insecurity" often triggers an allergic reaction, and is seen as deeply threatening to the core mission of alleviating poverty and improving human well-being.
The "Birkenstocks versus boots" stereotype tapped into a deep clash of visions and missions.
But the shifting nature of contemporary security challenges, and some specific events, eroded the neat compartmentalization of development and security concerns. Four significant changes can be highlighted. became more evident in such places as the Horn of Africa and the African Great Lakes region.
The end of the Cold War also somewhat muted the geopolitical concerns shaping development assistance.
Second, the genocide in Rwanda served as a wake-up call in some quarters, as Rwanda was a "donor darling" in the early 1990s, receiving the largest levels of per-capita development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. The massacre of more than 800,000 Tutsis by the genocidaire government suggested, however, that development policy that was not "conflict sensitive" could exacerbate conflicts, and find its entire raison d'être challenged (Uvin 1998).
Third, the changing nature of contemporary political violence-now almost entirely focused on internal, communal or civil conflicts, often between economically motivated armed groups such as the warlords in West Africa-meant that inter-state war essentially disappeared as a source of concern for policy-makers (Brzoska 2007; Kaldor 2006) . The changed nature of contemporary conflicts, and their often large-scale impacts on the civilian populations, meant that their developmental consequences could not easily be ignored. This was perhaps best exemplified by the nearly decade-long conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which involved armed groups and proxy forces from more than seven states, and cost upwards of five million lives, mainly because of increased mortality among the displaced populations of the region (Prunier 2009 ). The protracted nature of many internal conflicts, captured by the observation that around twenty percent of armed conflicts erupted into renewed violence within five years after a settlement, brought to the fore some of the challenges to achieving "progress in human wellbeing" in situations where state institutions were weak and conflict-prone (Suhrke and Samset 2007 ). An entire cottage industry has grown up around the analysis of failed, weak, or fragile states, and the governance and development challenges posed by these countries, home to more than 1.5 billion people, and recipients of roughly one-third of official development assistance (OECD 2011a: 11).
Finally, a more recent concern with the cross-border consequences and impacts of large-scale transnational organized criminal activity has emerged at the margins of the development agenda (UNODC 2005 (UNODC , 2007 . As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime put it, "The growth of global crime is a threat to the rule of law, without which there can be no sustainable world development." (UNODC 2010: 19) The linkages are complex and under-studied, but the basic argument-that large-scale criminal activity corrodes state institutions, undermines effective concerns of the development community.
At the conceptual level, a closer examination of how security and development might be linked was facilitated by the broadening of the definition of security from a narrow concern with the threat to state sovereignty posed by armed forces of external actors, to a concern with societal and human security: the security of people and communities within states (Hampson et al. 2001; Klingebiel 2006) . This mirrored the shift in development policies and practices from attention to "development as macro-economic growth" to concerns with human and sustainable development. Using a human security lens, it became clear that the negative impacts of conflict, crime, and violence on development did not necessarily diminish when armed conflict ended. In fact, various studies suggested that the threat of insecurity was merely displaced-from war and conflict to crime and "disorganized violence" (including sexual and gender-based violence), and sometimes further along the spectrum to more subtle forms of repression (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010) . One result was a cottage industry in publications and projects exploring the "security-development nexus" (Goodhand 2003; Tschirgi, Lund, and Mancini 2010; Stern and Öjendal 2010; Chandler 2007; Waddell 2006 ).
An integrated approach to conflict, crime, and violence
The previous section highlighted some of the ways in which sharp distinctions between different forms of violence and insecurity, whether caused by conflict or large-and small-scale criminal activity, are increasingly difficult to draw. One implication is that to assess the developmental impacts of violence and insecurity, analysts should adopt an integrated approach to conflict, crime, and violence to gain an overview of their global scope, scale, distribution, and changing nature. (per 100,000) from armed violence around the world, while the table presents the fifty-eight countries with rates of lethal violence greater than 10 per 100,000 (the global average rate of lethal violence is 7.9 per 100,000).
The first observation to make from the map and table is that the number of people dying in nonconflict settings is much greater than the number dying in conflicts: more than three-quarters of all victims of lethal violence die in non-conflict settings, while only about one-tenth die in direct conflict situations. 
The development costs of conflict, crime, and violence
A growing recognition that security from conflict, crime, and violence is a precondition for growth and development, and that persistent inequality, deprivation and underdevelopment can be a cause of conflict, violence, and insecurity, does not, however, demonstrate empirically how and under what conditions this relationship may hold. This section reviews what is known about these linkages and highlights the obstacles to making the case for precisely how conflict, crime, and violence may have a negative impact on development processes.
Despite the complex and fluid nature of most contemporary violence and insecurity, most analyses of the impact of conflict, crime, and violence on development and human well-being are not based on an integrated approach. Instead, research tends to rely upon two distinctions: the first concerning the level of organization of perpetrators (from highly organized collective groups to individuals), the second concerning the motivation behind the actions (from political/ideological to economic/material and individual psychological motivations). These two distinctions give rise to the matrix below (Table 1 ). Organized crime and large-scale non-conflict violence does not have the same effects as armed conflict (there is less destruction of physical capital and infrastructure, state institutions remain functioning, and there is less migration and displacement), so the pathways by which it has an impact on development are less visible. In addition, almost all research has concentrated on one direction of the relationship: the degree to which developmental challenges such as poverty, inequality, or weak criminal justice systems contribute to increased levels of violent crime (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002; Heinemann and Verner 2006; Neumayer 2005) .
Nevertheless, among its other human and social costs "crime has potentially deleterious consequences for growth, through reduced productivity and shortened planning horizons for investments in physical and human capital" (Soares 2009: 28) .
There are many approaches to calculating these costs, and the more comprehensive the calculation method , the higher the estimate is likely to be. In some Central American countries where such calculations have been attempted, the costs are equivalent to several percentage points of GDP per year. In Guatemala, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated health and lost productivity costs, private security costs, security and justice costs, and material losses at 7 percent of GDP per year. In El Salvador, the equivalent figure Regardless of which aspect of conflict, crime, or violence one looks at, insecurity in all its forms imposes significant development costs and is a "development disabler." But the implications for how development programming (or national policies and programs) could be oriented toward preventing and reducing conflict and violence are not clear, and depend on whether one regards conflict, crime, and violence as exogenous to the development process; as "givens" in a sociocultural context; as negative but unavoidable outcomes of the development process; or as an aspect of development that can (and should) be addressed as part of good development policy and practice. Certainly until recently, conflict, crime, and insecurity were regarded as regrettable but external aspects of the process of development, about which little could be done. This view has, however, been changing in the past decade.
Securitization of development
What have been the implications for development policies and programs of this changing understanding of the relationship between armed violence and development? Many donors developed both policy and programmatic responses addressing the link between insecurity and development, although there was also significant resistance in the development community to the perceived "securitization" of development. At the policy level, major development actors and agencies-including the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the German Development Institute, and others-all adopted specific policies to deal with work in conflict-affected or fragile states (OECD 2011a (OECD , 2008 DFID 2005; USAID 2005; SIDA 2006; Klingebiel 2006) .
In general, these policy frameworks recognized that development challenges in fragile, violent, and insecure situations were severe, and that "development as usual" programming was impossible or inappropriate in such contexts. In some cases, explicit commitments have been made to enhance spending in insecure regions: DFID, for example, has pledged to direct Development Cooperation Agency has made a similar commitment (DFID 2012).
Beyond this, many development actors promoted specific programs and principles that focused on particular "drivers" of conflict, crime, and insecurity, implicitly or explicitly recognizing that insecurity needed to be addressed as part of good development practice. This included a focus on promoting security and justice sector reform, facilitating peace processes, supporting armed violence prevention and reduction work, and promoting state building (OECD 2012).
Two things are noteworthy about this programming agenda. First, tackling broad issues such as "state building" recognizes that development programming without attention to issues of governance, legitimacy and institution-building is not likely to have the desired long-term results. The idea of "state building," with its resonance of colonial intervention at all levels of governance, represents, however, a huge and contested agenda (OECD 2011b). Second, efforts to work on specific aspects of security sector reform (SSR), including police training, military reform, and violence prevention and reduction, clearly transgresses the divide between development and security concerns of states and ruling elites, and reaches deep into the heart of the power structures of fragile and conflict-affected states (Sedra 2010).
These efforts to rethink the security-development nexus were not uncontested. At a subtle level, the nexus was reinterpreted as "promoting peace and security through development cooperation" (SIDA 2005 (SIDA , 2006 , which essentially argued that development practitioners merely had to be sensitive to the ways in which their programs could contribute to broader security-building goals, rather than rethinking where, what, and how they programmed (DFID 2005) . Co-optation was also sometimes coupled with more active resistance, as the potential subordination of development assistance and programming to geo-strategic imperatives gave rise to fears of the "securitization of development," either in terms of where development assistance was directed, or how development programming was done. As Klingebiel notes, "a choice of countries in development policy geared solely or primarily to security or geostrategic thinking would lead to withdrawal from countries and areas of activity . . . which did not have any (immediately) obvious relevance to security" (Klingebiel 2006: 5) . These fears were sometimes justified, as when Ministry of Defense officials argued that development assistance should be directed to places where states had deployed troops. At the programming level, the way in which development assistance was allocated and programmed could also be bent toward military and security imperatives, and the "risk of development policy being subordinated to objectives and strategies with a military bias are plausible in many areas and verifiable in a number of examples." (Klingebiel 2006: 5; DFID 2010) 
Future challenges
The World Bank's 2011 World Development Report focused on "conflict, security, and development," and marked a watershed in high-level policy attention to the securitydevelopment nexus. Yet as this chapter suggests, untangling the many ways in which conflict, crime, violence, and insecurity are linked to development processes, affecting each other in reinforcing and reciprocal ways, is not an easy task. What is clear is that armed conflict and criminal violence act as "development in reverse," and impose significant human, social, political, and economic costs on states and societies. Furthermore, the policy challenges-both for donor countries and for national violence prevention and reduction programs-are significant. Among other things, what is needed is a better micro-or local-level understanding of the complex social systems in which violence and crime are embedded, in order to identify clear entry points for policy and programming. Like all effective public policy, a strong evidence base is needed-and is still lacking-for most programming initiatives, with the result that sadly, "for too many in the developing world, insecurity remains the norm and development a dream that cruelly eludes their grasp" (Bates 2009: 115) .
